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COMMENTS
STATE MENU-LABELING LEGISLATION: A
DORMANT GIANT WAITING TO BE AWOKEN BY
COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGES
Lauren F. Gizzi+
The average restaurant patron is confronted with many difficult decisions:
should he start with a spinach salad or the fried calamari? Have his T-bone
cooked medium or medium-rare? Choose french fries or onion rings? Order
dessert, or just coffee? While many people consider themselves perfectly able
to make these decisions without more information, their choices become
arduous when faced with the task of choosing a meal based on dietary
restrictions. If a patron wishes to order a dessert that is least likely to expand
his waistline, he might rationally conclude that a slice of carrot cake is a more
healthful choice than a chocolate shake or a banana split. Little does he know,
but a slice of carrot cake from the Cheesecake Factory has 1560 calories, a
thirty-two ounce "Chocolate Triple Thick Shake" from McDonald's has 1160,
and a banana split from Hiagen-Dazs has 1100.1 Few restaurant patrons would
guess that three scoops of ice cream with whipped cream and chocolate sauce
is actually "healthier" than a slice of cake with shaved carrots in it.
Eating out has its costs, and although it may have once been considered a
special occasion, studies show that Americans now consume about one-third of
their calories and spend 46% of their food budget on "away-from-home
foods."2 These trends corroborate recent facts about the prevalence of obesity
+ B.A., Marquette University, 2004; J.D. Candidate 2009, The Catholic University of America,
Columbus School of Law. The author thanks Paul Alvarez for his invaluable guidance and for
challenging her to think like an exceptional constitutional lawyer, Jonathan Kastoff for his
patience and support, her parents, Alec and Karen, for all the opportunities they offered her, and
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy for telling her to "get out of here and go to law school."
1. MARGO G. WOOTAN, ANYONE'S GUESS, THE NEED FOR NUTRITION LABELING AT
FAST-FOOD AND OTHER CHAIN RESTAURANTS 8, 16 (2003), available at http://www.cspinet.org/
restaurantreport.pdf; see also McDonald's USA Nutrition Facts for Popular Menu Items,
http://nutrition.mcdonalds.com/bagamcmeal/nutritionfacts.pdf.
2. WOOTAN, supra note 1, at 1; see also THE KEYSTONE CTR., THE KEYSTONE FORUM ON
AWAY-FROM-HOME FOODS: OPPORTUNITIES FOR PREVENTING WEIGHT GAIN AND OBESITY 14
(2006), available at http://www.keystone.org/spp/documents/ForumReport FINAL_5-30-06.pdf
[hereinafter THE KEYSTONE CENTER REPORT]. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration
requested and funded the Keystone Forum as a means to find solutions to the public obesity crisis.
Id. at 4. The forum consisted of the opinions of various representatives from the "[food] industry,
government agencies, civic-sector organizations, and academia." Id. at 4.
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and associated health conditions.3 Obesity rates have doubled over the past
twenty years, and today, approximately 65% of the American public is
medically classified as overweight or obese.4 The National Institute of Health
has warned that the costs of obesity go beyond purchasing a new wardrobe.
The health risks of being overweight or obese include an increased rate of:
morbidity; hypertension; dyslipidemia (a metabolic disease resulting from high
levels of triglycerides and low-density lipoproteins); type 2 diabetes; coronary
heart disease; congestive heart failure; stroke; osteoarthritis; sleep apnea; colon
cancer; breast cancer; pregnancy complications; and negative psychosocial
effects.5
In an effort to combat the obesity epidemic, certain states and local
governments have proposed or passed legislation requiring chain restaurants to
post nutrition information alongside item prices on menus or menu boards.
6
For example, in King County, Washington, restaurants must provide the total
number of calories, grams of trans fat, grams of saturated fat, grams of
carbohYdrates, and milligrams of sodium next to each standard item on the
menu. If the restaurant operates by using a menu board, like most fast-food
chains, it only needs to provide the total number of calories next to each item.
8
3. See WOOTAN, supra note 1, at 1-2. It is not difficult to see the correlation between
eating out and excessive calorie consumption. It is common for a single dish at a restaurant to
provide over half of a person's daily caloric intake (over 1000 calories). Id. at 7. Also, children's
meals at restaurants are estimated to contain approximately 350 more calories per meal than those
prepared at home. Id. at 6.
4. Id. at 1. A recent study published by the online journal Obesity soberly predicts that by
2030, more than 86% of adults will be overweight or obese if current trends continue.
Youfa Wang et al., Will All Americans Become Overweight or Obese? Estimating the
Progression and Cost of the U.S. Obesity Epidemic, 16 OBESITY 2323, 2323 (2008), available at
http://www.nature.com/oby/joumal/v16/nI0/pdf/oby2008351a.pdf; see also Johns Hopkins
University Bloomberg School of Public Health, Study Suggests 86 Percent of Americans Could
Be Overweight or Obese by 2030, SCIENCEDAILY, July 29, 2008, available at http://www.science
daily.com/releases/2008/07/080728192936.htm#.
5. See NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH: NATIONAL HEART, LUNG, AND BLOOD
INSTITUTE, CLINICAL GUIDELINES ON THE IDENTIFICATION, EVALUATION, AND TREATMENT OF
OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY IN ADULTS: THE EVIDENCE REPORT 12-23 (NIH Publication No.
98-4083, Sept. 1998) [hereinafter CLINICAL GUIDELINES].
6. See CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST, NUTRITION LABELING IN CHAIN
RESTAURANTS: STATE AND LOCAL BILLS/REGULATIONS-2007-2008, 1-13, http://www.
cspinet.org/nutritionpolicy/MenuLabelingBills2007-2008.pdf [hereinafter CSPI 2007-08 BILLS].
To demonstrate feasibility, the Center for Science in the Public Interest has posted on its website
a few images of menus labeled with caloric information. See CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB.
INTEREST, MENUS & MENU BOARDS WITH NUTRITION INFORMATION, http://www.cspinet.org/
menulabeling/boards.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2009). The examples of menu boards include
Starbucks, McDonald's, Auntie Anne's, and Wendy's. Id. For a copy of Wendy's full menu
board, see CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST, WENDY'S MENU BOARD, http://www.cspinet.
org/menulabeling/wendysboards.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2009).
7. KING COUNTY, WASH., BOARD OF HEALTH CODE ch. 5.10.015 (2008).
8. Id.
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The jurisdictions that currently require menu labeling by law include: the
State of California;9 New York City;' Philadelphia, Pennsylvania;1 ' and King
County, Washington. In July 2008, New York City became the first
municipality to commence enforcement of its menu-labeling law, issuing fines
of up to $2000 to restaurants that failed to post the caloric content of foods and
beverages. 3  After New York City proved the implementation of menu-
labeling laws to be feasible, California became the first state to enact such
legislation on a statewide basis.' 4  Governor Schwarzenegger signed
California's menu-labeling bill (S.B. 1420) into law on September 30, 2008; 15
it is to go into effect January 1, 2011.16
These jurisdictions hope to provide their citizens with accurate nutritional
information to help them make more informed decisions when eating out.
17
9. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 114094 (West Supp. 2009); Press Release, Office of
the Governor, Gov. Schwarzenegger Signs Legislation Promoting Nutrition and Healthier
Options (Sept. 30, 2008), available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/print-version/press-
release/10682/ [hereinafter Press Release, Gov. Schwarzenegger Signs Legislation].
Before the passage of California's statewide menu-labeling bill, several municipalities in
California, such as the city of San Francisco and Santa Clara County, enacted their own laws on
the subject. See S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE §§ 468.2-.8 (2008); Santa Clara County, Cal.,
Ordinance No. NS-300.793 (June 3, 2008), available at http://www.sccgov.org/SCC/docs/
SCC%20Public%2OPortal/keyboard%20agenda/BOS%20Agenda/2008/June%2024,%202008/T
MPKeyboard202298556.pdf; see also Erin Allday, Supervisors Tell Chain Restaurants to Post
Nutrition Information, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 12, 2008, at C1; Tomas Roman, Santa Clara Co. Fast
Food Must Post Calories, ABC7NEWS.COM (S.F.), June 3, 2008, http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/
story?section=news/local&id=6183685.
These local California laws, however, are no longer effective because the new California state
law expressly preempts their application. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 114094(j); S.B. 1420,
§ 2(j), 2008 Leg., 2007-2008 Sess. (Cal. 2008). The text of the state law is quite clear:
(j) To the extent consistent with federal law, this section, as well as any other state
law that regulates the disclosure of nutritional information, is a matter of statewide
concern and occupies the whole field of regulation regarding the disclosure of
nutritional information by a food facility. No ordinance or regulation of a local
government shall regulate the dissemination of nutritional information by a food
facility. Any ordinance or regulation that violates this prohibition is void and shall
have no force or effect.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 114094(j).
10. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., HEALTH CODE § 81.50 (2006).
11. PHILA. HEALTH CODE § 6-308 (2008); Teresa Masterson, Reality Fat Check: Menu
Label Law Signed, NBCPHILADELPHIA.COM, Dec. 19, 2008, http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/
health/diet fitness/Reality-Fat-Check-Menu-Label-Law-Signed.html.
12. KING COUNTY, WASH., BOARD OF HEALTH CODE ch. 5.10.015 (2008).
13. Roni Caryn Rabin, New Yorkers Try to Swallow Calorie Sticker Shock, MSNBC.COM,
July 16, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25464987/.
14. Press Release, Gov. Schwarzenegger Signs Legislation, supra note 9.
15. Id.
16. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 114094(c) (West Supp. 2009).
17. See, e.g., Allday, supra note 9. San Francisco Supervisor Tom Ammiano, who authored
the city's menu-labeling bill said, "[w]e want an informed public making informed choices about
what they eat." Id.
2009]
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Yet, this legislation, as beneficial as it may be, likely violates the Dormant
Commerce Clause as a barrier to free trade among the states.18 The central
tenet of the Dormant Commerce Clause is that, in giving Congress the power
to regulate commerce among the states, the Commerce Clause impliedly
requires the states to refrain from placing economic barriers between
themselves and other states that would disrupt the unified national economy.19
State menu-labeling legislation places economic burdens on large chain
restaurants, such as McDonald's and Applebee's, by mandating that they keep
their menus updated with accurate nutritional data.20  With multiple states
adopting menu-labeling requirements, chain restaurants will likely find it ever
more difficult to comply with all of these mandates. 2
1
The Supreme Court has recognized that state legislation may be
unconstitutional in two different ways under the Commerce Clause. 22 The first
is when Congress expressly regulates a certain aspect of commerce and federal
18. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 532 (1949) ("Neither the power
to tax nor the police power may be used by the state of destination with the aim and effect of
establishing an economic barrier against competition with the products of another state .
(quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511,527 (1935))).
19. See id. at 532-33. The Court found that New York could not deny H.P. Hood & Sons a
license to open a new plant solely to protect New York producers from competition. Id. at 526-
27, 545. Justice Jackson, writing for the Court, recognized that:
The sole purpose for ... the Constitution was to take into consideration the trade of the
United States; to examine the relative situations and trade of the said States; [and] to
consider how far a uniform system in their commercial regulations may be necessary to
their common interest and their permanent harmony ....
Id. at 533.
20. See THE NAT'L REST. ASS'N, MYTH vs. REALITY: NUTRITION LABELING AT CHAIN
RESTAURANTS 2 (2007), available at http://www.restaurant.org/government/state/nutrition/
resources/ml-myths vs reality.pdf [hereinafter MYTH]; see also S.B. 1290, § 3 (1)(a), 185th
Gen. Court, 2007-2008 Sess. (Mass. 2007) ("A restaurant or food establishment shall provide
nutritional information for all standard menu items listed on the menu .... ). A standard item is
one that appears on the menu for longer than thirty days per year. Id. § 3(1)(f). Most legislation
makes labeling requirements only applicable to restaurant chains in order to avoid crippling
smaller businesses with the costs of providing nutrition data. See, e.g., id. § 3(l)(c) ("A
restaurant is exempt if it has fewer than ten locations nationally .... ").
21. See Julie Sturgeon, QSRs Ponder Cost of Menu-Labeling Laws, QSRWEB.COM, July 8,
2008, http://www.qsrweb.com/article.php?id=l 1151 ("[I]ndustry insiders contend the information
already is available on the Web and through in-store brochures, so meddling with the menu board
simply is frustrating. For national chains in affected areas, complying with each of the local
ordinances is equally challenging."); see also The Impact of the Nutrition Labeling and Education
Act of 1990 on the Food Industry, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 605, 607 (1995) (noting that the food
industry welcomed the national labeling law because it was weary of the burdens of complying
with fifty different state labeling laws).
22. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) ("The first inquiry is whether
Congress, pursuant to its power to regulate commerce, has prohibited state regulation of the
particular aspects of commerce .... (citation omitted)); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S.
511, 521-23 (1935) (holding that even legislation that regulates a quintessential state interest such
as health must be struck down when it impermissibly burdens commerce among the several
states).
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legislation preempts states from imposing their own standards.23 The second is
when Congress takes no action, yet the state legislation impermissibly burdens
interstate commerce to some degree.
24
Food labeling is an area in which Congress has already regulated; 25 thus, any
state regulation of food labeling is subject to federal law preemption. 26  In
271990, Congress passed the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA),
which provided collective reform of the content of information on food
packaging. 28 However, Congress carefully crafted the NLEA to ensure that it
did not preempt state efforts to regulate nutrition disclosures in restaurants.
29
The NLEA imposed requirements on both the way that food producers display
factual data to the consumer, 30 and on the way that they make "[n]utrition
level[] and health-related claims" on packaging. 3 1 Today, products on store
shelves must have a nutrition information label, 32 and if the product
manufacturer makes a claim that the product is, for example "low fat" or helps
prevent cancer, the manufacturer must follow additional guidelines set by the
Department of Health and Human Services.33 However, the statute expressly
exempts restaurants from the nutrition information requirements imposed on
packaged food producers, purposely leaving a regulatory gap in which the
states could regulate restaurants.
34
23. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 426, 432-36 (1819) ("This great
principle is, that the constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme; that they
control the constitution and laws of the respective states, and cannot be controlled by them.").
24. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 669 (1981). Justice Powell noted
that, "[t]he Clause permits Congress to legislate when it perceives that the national welfare is not
furthered by the independent actions of the States. It is now well established, also, that the Clause
itself is 'a limitation upon state power even without congressional implementation."' Id. at 669
(quoting Hunt v. Wash. Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977)).
25. 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)-(r) (2000).
26. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824) (holding that where "acts of
the State Legislatures . . . interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress ... the act of
Congress . . . is supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not
controverted, must yield to it"). Moreover, section six of the Nutrition Labeling and Education
Act of 1990 expressly preempts state nutrition labeling laws "as to any food in interstate
commerce." Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, § 6, 104 Stat.
2353, 2362 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2000)).
27. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act § 6.
28. See 136 CONG. REc. H5836, H5840.
29. See discussion infra Part III.
30. 21 U.S.C. § 343(q).
31. Id. § 343(r).
32. See id. § 343(q); 21 C.F.R. § 101.9 (2006) (implementing nutrition labeling
requirements).
33. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(2)(A)-(B).
34. Id. §§ 343(q)(5)(A)(i), 343-1(a)(4); see also Brief for U.S. Congressman Henry
Waxman et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellees at 1, N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v.
N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 509 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 08-1892-CV) (arguing that
2009]
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Part I of this Comment traces the Commerce Clause implications of state
menu-labeling legislation by first discussing the limitations and objectives of
the Commerce Clause, specifically focusing on the intentions of the Framers
and the meaning of the Dormant Commerce Clause. This Part then sets forth
the scenarios in which state legislation has been invalidated under the
Commerce Clause. Next, Part II describes the current state of menu-labeling
legislation and the general requirements of such regulations. Part III discusses
the NLEA and its preemptive effect on state legislation.
Part IV analyzes menu-labeling legislation under the Supreme Court's
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The discussion addresses the three
scenarios in which the Court will hold state law invalid under the Dormant
Commerce Clause: (1) when the state law is facially discriminatory, 35 (2) when
it is facially neutral but discriminatory in purpose or effect,36 and (3) when it is
facially neutral but where the potential state benefit is illusory compared to the
burden it imposes on interstate commerce.
37
Finally, Part V concludes with a solution for the future: namely, that menu-
labeling legislation must be adopted on a federal level to ensure uniformity and
maximum influence on the health of Americans.
I. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE: AN AFFIRMATIVE GRANT OF POWER TO
CONGRESS AND A NEGATIVE IMPLICATION ON THE STATES
The simple words of the Commerce Clause in Article I, Section 8, of the
U.S. Constitution are the source of many connotations. The text reads:
"Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several
"New York City stepped into a sphere that Congress intentionally left open to state and local
governments").
35. See, e.g., Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 278, 282 (1876) (invalidating state law that
defined sellers of out-of-state goods to be "peddlers" and only subjected "peddlers" to a licensing
requirement).
36. See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193-94 (1994) (commenting
that states often try to achieve a protectionist goal without divulging such purpose in the text of
the statute). After noting that a tariff is the "paradigmatic example of a law discriminating against
interstate commerce," the Court stated that: "In fact, tariffs against the products of other States are
so patently unconstitutional that our cases reveal not a single attempt by any State to enact one.
Instead, the cases are filled with state laws that aspire to reap some of the benefits of tariffs by
other means." Id. at 193.
37. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 138, 146 (1970) (striking down an
Arizona law that required cantaloupe to be crated and packaged for sale before leaving the state
as export). In Pike, the Court provided the classic statement of the law with respect to the
treatment of facially neutral laws that unduly burden interstate commerce under the Dormant
Commerce Clause. The Court declared: "Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate
a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will
be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits." Id. at 142 (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440,
443 (1960)).
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,,38
States. From this, the Supreme Court has extracted the notion that the
Commerce Clause is an affirmative grant of power to Congress to restrict
independent state action in order to promote nationwide free trade.39 This
power allows Congress to regulate "the channels of interstate commerce," such
as highways, rivers, railroads, and airspace. 40 Congress may also regulate the
instrumentalities that actually move commerce, such as trucks, boats, trains,
and airplanes.4' In addition, Congress may regulate activities that
"substantially affect interstate commerce. ' '42  These intrastate activities have
ranged from unfair labor practices 43 to motels that host interstate travelers.
44
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
39. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-200, 206 (1824). John Marshall was
the first to define "commerce" under the Commerce Clause, stating: "Commerce, undoubtedly, is
traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse." Id. at 189. He also recognized that the word
"among" showed that Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce did not extend to
commercial activities entirely within a state (that is, intrastate activities). Id. at 194-95; see also
Hunt v. Wash. Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977).
40. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (holding that "Congress may regulate
the use of the channels of interstate commerce" (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964))); see also Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 147 (2003)
(holding that because the regulation in question "[could] be viewed as legislation aimed at
improving safety in the channels of commerce and increasing protection for the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce," it "[fell] within Congress' Commerce Clause power").
41. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. In Lopez, the Court noted: "Congress is empowered to regulate
and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities." Id.; see also
Guillen, 537 U.S. at 147.
42. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 32 (1937); see also Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 558-59. The Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, particularly with respect to
the standard by which commerce is defined, has evolved over the years. In Jones & Laughlin, the
Court stated that "[i]t is the effect upon commerce, not the source of the injury, which is the
criterion." Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 32 (emphasis added). But in Lopez, the Court defined
Congress's Commerce Clause power more narrowly, stating that "Congress' commerce authority
includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce." Lopez, 514 U.S. at
558-59 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). However, the Court in Lopez did not actually apply
the "substantial effect" test; rather, the Court held that Congress's Commerce Clause power with
respect to interstate commerce is limited to regulating activities that have a substantial economic
effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 560; see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610,
613 (2000) (finding that "a fair reading of Lopez shows that the noneconomic, criminal nature of
the conduct at issue was central to our decision in that case"). But see Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (stating "Congress has the power to regulate activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce").
43. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 30-32 (upholding the National Labor Relations Act).
44. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (upholding the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 because racial discrimination in motels catering to travelers
detrimentally affects interstate commerce).
20093
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Under the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, when Congress regulates in a
certain area, states cannot adopt conflicting legislation.45
Along with conferring on Congress the explicit power to "regulate
Commerce ... among the several States,' 46 the Commerce Clause also forbids
certain state action in the absence of congressional regulation.47 Lying
dormant in the text of Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution is the notion that
individual states must not take action that is equivalent to placing imposts and
48duties on interstate commerce. In 1935, writing for the majority in Baldwin
v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., Justice Cardozo found that such a practice was
prohibited by the Constitution because the Framers explicitly gave the power
to regulate commerce to Congress. 49 The U.S. Supreme Court has continued to
read this negative implication of power into the Constitution based on the
intent of the Framers in drafting the Commerce Clause.
50
Never forgetting the sting of failure resulting from the Articles of
Confederation, the delegates at the Second Constitutional Convention sought
to ensure unity in the new republic.51  If the individual states mandated
dissimilar sets of rules and regulations according to their own interests, the
nation would be nothing more than fifty independent countries coexisting
under the guise of one name, each imposing its own taxes and other economic
burdens on the other.5 2 Therefore, the Supreme Court has held that, even in an
absence of congressional regulation, the Commerce Clause invalidates
53protectionist state legislation that imposes burdens on interstate commerce.
45. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425-26 (1819) ("This great
principle is, that the constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme; that they
control the constitution and laws of the respective States, and cannot be controlled by them.").
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
47. See, e.g., Hunt v. Wash. Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977) (noting that
the Commerce Clause is "a limitation upon state power even without congressional
implementation").
48. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511,521-22(1935).
49. Id. at 522 ("Imposts and duties upon interstate commerce are placed beyond the power
of a state, without the mention of an exception, by the provision committing commerce of that
order to the power of the Congress.").
50. See, e.g., Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1804-05 (2008) (finding
that Kentucky's exemption of interest made on state or municipality-issued bonds from state
income taxes did not violate the dormant commerce clause); United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-
Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1790 (2007).
51. See Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 523 ("[The Constitution] was framed upon the theory that the
peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and
salvation are in union and not division.").
52. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 532 (1949) (explaining that the
effect on the nation would "set a barrier to traffic between one state and another as effective as if
customs duties, equal to the price differential, had been laid upon the thing transported" (quoting
Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 521)).
53. See id. Even if a state law seeks to regulate commerce for the purpose of protecting the
health or safety of its own citizens, it may be invalid if the law effectively gives in-state citizens
an advantage over out-of-state citizens. See id.; see also Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp.,
[Vol. 58:501
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However, not all state legislation that burdens interstate commerce is
invalid.54 The Court has long recognized that the states possess a "residuum of
power" to create laws of local concern, such as public health and safety, even
if the laws affect interstate commerce to some degree.55 These laws maintain a
"strong presumption of validity," because matters of public welfare have lon
been considered quintessential subjects of state, and not federal, regulation.
However, the Court has been clear in pointing out that these laws will still be
subject to review under the Commerce Clause, and will be deemed invalid if
state health or safety goals are trivial while the burden on commerce is
substantial.5 7
The state laws that the Supreme Court has invalidated under the Dormant
Commerce Clause have touched on many different areas of the economy.
They include the regulation of taxation,5  waste management,59
450 U.S. 662, 669 (1981) ("The [Commerce] Clause requires that some aspects of trade generally
must remain free from interference by the States. When a State ventures excessively into the
regulation of these aspects of commerce, it 'trespasses upon national interests,' and the courts will
hold the state regulation invalid under the Clause alone." (citation omitted)).
54. See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945) (holding that when the effect on
"national commerce" is not substantial, the dormant Commerce Clause may not apply its
preclusive effect).
55. See id. ("[l]n the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress, there is a residuum of
power in the state to make laws governing matters of local concern .... ).
56. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 523-24 (1959); see also United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act as an
impermissible extension of Congress's Commerce Clause power into the sphere reserved for a
state's general police power); Kassel, 450 U.S. at 687 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[The majority
opinion] seriously intrudes upon the fundamental right of the States to pass laws to secure the
safety of their citizens."). In his concurrence in Lopez, Justice Kennedy suggested that Congress
may not regulate matters of local concern when they have "nothing to do with the regulation of
commercial activities." See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Keeping the line
between state and federal regulation clear is essential to federalism under the Constitution. Id. at
575-77.
57. See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 670.
58. See, e.g., S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160, 170-71 (1999) (invalidating
a franchise tax scheme that gave Alabama corporations the ability to reduce their tax liability by
lowering the par value of their stock while offering no such opportunity to out-of-state
corporations); Camps Newfoundland/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 595
(1997) (ruling that a Maine statue that gave charitable institutions a tax exemption was invalid
because it required the charity to operate principally for the benefit of Maine residents, and not
out-of-state residents); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 312 (1997) (upholding the sale
and use taxes on the purchase of natural gas from sellers who were not within Ohio's statutory
definition of a natural gas company).
59. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394-95 (1994)
(invalidating a Clarkstown, New York "flow control" ordinance that required all the town's waste
to be deposited at the new solid waste transfer facility that charged a higher fee than out-of-state
processors); Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 348 (1992) (invalidating an
Alabama statute that charged a fee for the disposal of out-of-state hazardous waste while
requiring no such fee for the disposal of hazardous waste created in-state); City of Phila. v. New
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transportation, the sale of goods (including licensing and processing
requirements), 61 as well as pricing 62 and labeling, among others.63
A. Overt Discrimination as Presumptively Invalid
Current Supreme Court jurisprudence on the Dormant Commerce Clause
holds that state laws are invalid in three different scenarios. The first scenario
occurs when a state statute facially discriminates against out-of-state
commerce; 64 that is, a plain reading of the law reveals the state's attempt to
65 6block interstate trade. Laws that do so are presumptively invalid.66  These
laws usually impose a restriction related to the state's physical state border,
treating in-state entrepreneurs differently than those from out-of-state.
67
The most recent cases dealing with facial discrimination involved state
regulation of waste disposal and state taxes or fees. 6 8 In City of Philadelphia v.
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628-29 (1978) (declaring unconstitutional a statute that forbade the
importation of solid or liquid waste generated outside New Jersey).
60. See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 670-71 (invalidating the Iowa prohibition of double trailers on
its highways); S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 783-84 (striking down the Arizona Train Limit Law of
1912, which limited passenger trains to fourteen cars and freight trains to seventy cars); S.C. State
Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 196 (1938) (upholding a statute that
forbade the use of trucks that were over ninety inches wide and had a gross weight greater than
20,000 pounds).
61. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1951) (invalidating
the Madison, Wisconsin law that only allowed milk processed within five miles of the city to be
sold in the city); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 545 (1949) (striking down
the practice of denying a license to a milk receiving depot for the sole purpose of limiting
competition with local business).
62. See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 524-26 (1935) (holding
unconstitutional the New York Milk Control Act of 1933, as applied to out-of-state producers, on
the grounds that the producers could not sell milk in New York if bought below New York's
fixed price).
63. See, e.g., Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 352-54 (1977)
(invalidating a South Carolina statute that prohibited Washington State apples from bearing the
state's own grade label, which was of greater or equal quality than the standard required by the
USDA).
64. See, e.g., City ofPhila., 437 U.S. at 628 ("The New Jersey law at issue in this case falls
squarely within the area that the Commerce Clause puts off limits to state regulation. On its face,
it imposes on out-of-state commercial interests the full burden of conserving the State's
remaining landfill space.").
65. See id.
66. See id. at 628-29. One might infer from the Court's discussion of quarantine laws that
these laws may be the only exception to the per se invalidity of facially discriminatory legislation.
See id. ("It is true that certain quarantine laws have not been considered forbidden protectionist
measures, even though they were directed against out-of-state commerce.").
67. See, e.g., Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 278 (1876). In this case, the Court struck
down a Missouri law that imposed a licensing requirement only on peddlers of out-of-state goods.
Id. at 278, 282. Peddlers who sold Missouri products were exempt. Id. at 278.
68. See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 95 (1994) (concerning a
higher fee imposed on disposal of out-of-state waste); Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504
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New Jersey, the Court held that a New Jersey statute prohibiting the
importation of "solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside
the territorial limits of the State" was unconstitutional. 69 The Court found that
it was a violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause for a state to either
exclude an article of commerce from the state or keep an article entirely inside
the state. 70  The distinction was of no consequence because either scenario,
protectionism or isolationism, created a barrier to the interstate commerce.
71
B. Reading Between the Lines: Neutral Laws that Have an Invalid Purpose or
Effect
A state statute can also violate the Dormant Commerce Clause when it is
facially neutral, but has a discriminatory purpose or effect on interstate
commerce. 72 These statutes are per se invalid because, although they may not
be outwardly discriminatory, the legislature had a discriminatory intent. 3 A
protectionist intent was partially the reason for the Court's ruling in Kassel v.
Consolidated Freightways Corp.74 In this case, the Court considered the
validity of an Iowa law that prohibited the use of sixty-five-foot double trailers
on its highways, but provided for a "border-cities exemption" to allow the use
of those trucks in commercially important cities along the border. 75 The Court
determined that such a law was not motivated by safety interests, which would
make it more legitimate under the Commerce Clause; rather, Iowa's real
purpose in enacting the law was to promote in-state interests at the expense of
out-of-state businesses. 76 Under the law, Iowa enjoyed the benefits of double
trailers where they were most needed, but avoided the associated costs of the
trucks traveling on its highways.7 7 The Court also considered the exemption of
U.S. 334, 343-44 (1992) (regarding a hazardous waste disposal fee on waste generated out of
state); City of Phila., 437 U.S. at 628-29 (1978) (also concerning waste disposal).
69. City ofPhila., 437 U.S. at 618.
70. Id. at 628 ("[T]he State has overtly moved to slow or freeze the flow of commerce for
protectionist reasons. It does not matter that the State has shut the article of commerce inside the
State in one case and outside the State in the other.").
71. See id.
72. See Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 265 (1984) (holding that a tax exemption
for any product that contained extracts of a plant indigenous to Hawaii was discriminatory, even
though the exemption was not explicitly along state lines); see also Hunt v. Wash. State Apple
Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 352-53 (1977).
73. See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522-23 (1935) (holding that the
stabilization of milk prices for the purpose of providing for the welfare of New York farmers
could not be justified based on the police power when the state's real motive was economic in
nature).
74. See450 U.S. 622, 676-78 (1981).
75. Id. at 665-66 & n.6. The exemption allowed cities bordering other states to adopt local
truck-length ordinances. Id. at 676.
76. Id. at 676-78.
77. Id. at 676. The benefits of diverting longer trucks around Iowa included fewer
accidents, lower insurance premiums, and less road wear. Id. at 676 & n.19 (citing the district
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sixty-foot livestock or farm vehicles from the law to be "undoubtedly . . .
helpful to local interests," indicating that a protectionist intent was also
apparent in this exemption.78
In addition, even if it is not the purpose of the legislature to promote state
interests at the expense of out-of-state entities, laws that have this effect can be
invalidated. 79  This was the case in Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Advertising. North Carolina imposed a labeling requirement that required all
apple containers sold in the state to bear either the U.S. Department of
81Agriculture (USDA) grade label or no label at all. Washington State objected
to the labeling law because Washington exported apples with its labels
indicating that the apples had been inspected according to Washington State
standards, which were equal to or higher than the USDA's. 82  The
discriminatory character of the law had three effects. First, growers in
Washington State had to bear the costs of changing their labels solely on
cartons shipped to North Carolina, whereas growers within North Carolina
only had to comply with one labeling standard.83 Second, the North Carolina
law denied Washington the benefit of advertising its strict apple quality
standards. 84  Finally, because Washington apples were downgraded to the
USDA standard, the law allowed local growers to compete with Washington
growers on a level playing field even though it had not been earned.85
C. The Balancing Inquiry as a Final Hurdle
When a state statute is facially neutral and its purpose or effect is not
necessarily discriminatory, it can still violate the Commerce Clause when the
court's findings). The Court also placed emphasis on the Governor's veto of the first bill that
would have included the use of sixty-five-foot double trailers. See id. at 677. The Governor was
mainly concerned that allowing such trucks would "provid[e] a great advantage for out-of-state
trucking firms at the expense of . . . Iowa citizens." Id. This indicated to the Court that
economics and not safety was the main purpose of enacting such legislation. See id.
78. Id. at 676.
79. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 352-53 (1977)
(declining to even consider a protectionist intent because the discriminatory effect of the
legislation was so apparent).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 335. The statute required that "all closed containers of apples sold, offered for
sale, or shipped into the State to bear 'no grade other than the applicable U.S. grade or standard."'
Id.
82. Id. at 336-37. Washington has a considerable interest in protecting its reputation as
having superior quality apples. The apple industry accounts for a significant portion of
Washington's economy, and the state is the nation's largest producer of apples. Id. Further, the
state's strict inspection program costs the state's apple farmers approximately one million dollars
per year. Id.
83. Id. at 350-51.
84. Id. at351.
85. Id. at 351-52.
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concern for interstate commerce outweighs the potential local benefit.86 The
test used by the Court, commonly known as the "Pike balancing test,"
87
requires a weighing process under the Commerce Clause.88  This process
involves "a sensitive consideration of the weight and nature of the state
regulatory concern in light of the extent of the burden imposed on the course of
interstate commerce."
89
This test was set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., a case that invalidated
an Arizona law requiring Arizona-grown cantaloupes to advertise their state of
origin. 90 Bruce Church grew cantaloupes in Arizona that were of higher
quality than the Arizona standards and shipped them to California to be
packaged because the company had no packaging facilities in Arizona.
9 1
Arizona ordered Church to cease operations in regards to shipping his fruit to
California to be packaged, compliance with this order would have resulted in a
substantial loss to the company.92 The Court found that this burden on Church
was substantial when weighed against the state interest in enhancing the
reputation of Arizona growers through product labeling. 93 The Court reasoned
that "the State's tenuous interest in having the company's cantaloupes
identified as originating in Arizona cannot constitutionally justify the
requirement that the company build and operate an unneeded $200,000
packing plant in the State. The nature of that burden is, constitutionally, more
significant than its extent."
94
The Pike balancing test has been applied to state regulation of the
transportation industry, as well as other areas, 95 but it has not existed without
86. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). The Court explicated the
following rule:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Id (citation omitted).
87. See, e.g., Med. Waste Assocs. v. Mayor & City Council of Bait., 966 F.2d 148, 150 (4th
Cir. 1992).
88. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (weighing the burdens on interstate commerce against
"putative local benefits"); see also Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 443
(1978).
89. Raymond Motor Transp., 434 U.S. at 441.
90. Pike, 397 U.S. at 145-46.
91. Id. at 139.
92. Id. at 139-40.
93. Id. at 145.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670-71 (1981) (striking
down the Iowa law forbidding double trailers from using Iowa highways). Even before Pike, the
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controversy. Because the test involves questions of degree, some Justices have
written that this "test" is no more than policy-making, a task that should be left
to the legislature. 96 They argue that the Court cannot make determinations on
how safe or how health-promoting the legislation is compared with its burden
on commerce. 97 Such a determination considers whether the law enacted is the
best option or whether a different statute could better achieve the state's goals,
both of which are inappropriate tasks for the courts. 98  Justice Scalia, for
example, feels that the only appropriate test under the Commerce Clause is
whether the state law "accords discriminatory treatment to interstate commerce
in a respect not required to achieve a lawful state purpose." 99 When a state has
a lawful purpose for its legislation, Justice Scalia argues that the only entity
that can invalidate it under the Commerce Clause is Congress.
100
II. A NEW IDEA: STATE MENU-LABELING LEGISLATION
This Comment has shown that state legislation may be invalid because it is
facially discriminatory, discriminatory in purpose or effect, if the local benefits
are outweighed by the burden the legislation places on commerce, or some
combination of the three. As more states and municipalities consider their
adoption, and more Americans learn of their existence, menu-labeling statutes
will be the newest legislation to come within the scope of the Dormant
Commerce Clause tests. What once seemed like the far-fetched idea of a
health-nut legislator, state and local menu-labeling laws are going into effect
all over the country, forcing many in the restaurant industry to comply with
their parameters.1
0 1
Beginning in 2003 and continuing into 2009, menu-labeling bills came
before state legislatures and municipal supervisors, requiring restaurants to
court used the same essential weighing test. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 783-
84 (1945) (declaring a restriction on the length of trains as invalid); S.C. State Highway Dep't v.
Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 196 (1938) (upholding truck width and weight restrictions).
The Court has also used a balancing approach in areas other than transportation. See, e.g.,
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470-74 (1981) (upholding a state law that
banned the sale of milk in plastic non-recyclable containers, but allowed sales in non-recyclable
containers such as those made of pulpwood, a major Minnesota product); Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 133-34 (1978) (sustaining a law that prohibited producers of
petroleum products from operating retail service stations in Maryland).
96. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897-98 (1988) (Scalia,
J., concurring); Kassel, 450 U.S. at 691 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Such an approach ... would
also arrogate to this Court functions of forming public policy, functions which, in the absence of
congressional action, were left by the Framers of the Constitution to state legislatures.").
97. See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 691 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
98. See id. at 690.
99. See Bendix Autolite, 486 U.S. at 898 (Scalia, J., concurring).
100. Id.
101. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text; see also Rabin, supra note 13.
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post certain nutrition data on menus or menu boards.' 0 2 As of January 1, 2009,
eight states and two municipalities are considering whether to adopt menu-
labeling mandates. 1° 3  Many of the proposed bills would impose similar
labeling requirements. For example, almost all require that only restaurants
with ten or more locations be subject to the regulation. 104 Other requirements
include nutrient labeling parameters, such as what information needs to be
disclosed, such as fat and caloric content'0 5 and the manner in which this
information is made available to the public.'
0 6
This type of legislation is ambitious-no such legislation had ever been
enacted until December 5, 2006, when the New York City Board of Health
passed Health Code Section 81.50.107 Although this legislation did not take
effect until July 1, 2007, its passage instantly stirred much local and national
debate. 108 As a rationale for the new law, the New York City Board of Health
102. For a list of recent legislation see CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST, STATE
RESTAURANT LABELING BILLS: 2003-2004, http://www.cspinet.org/nutritionpolicy/menu_
labelingbills.pdf [hereinafter CSPI 2003-04 BILLS]; CSPI 2007-08 BILLS, supra note 6.
103. See infra notes 131-41 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., H.B. 54, 24th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2007), available at
http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2008/bills/HB54.htm (ten or more establishments); S.F.
2158, 82nd Gen. Assem., 2008 Sess. (Iowa 2008) (twenty-one or more locations statewide); S.B.
211, 2008 Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008) (twenty or more locations in Kentucky); S.B. 1290,
185th Gen. Court, 2007-2008 Sess. (Mass. 2007) (ten or more locations nationally); A. 1407,
213th Leg., 2008 Sess. (N.J. 2008) (twenty or more locations in New Jersey); A. 729, 2007 State
Assemb., 2007 Sess. (N.Y. 2007) (fifteen or more locations nationally and five locations in New
York State); see also CSPI 2007-08 BILLS, supra note 6, at 1-13 (explaining specific labeling
requirements in various bills). Some states included additional requirements such as operating
five locations within the state itself. See CSPI 2003-04 BILLS, supra note 102. A bill introduced
in the Texas Legislature in 2003 only required three locations within the state of Texas, without
regard to whether the chain operated nationally. H.B. 3153, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003);
see also CSP1 2003-04 BILLS, supra note 102 (describing the Texas labeling bill).
105. See generally CSPI 2007-08 BILLS, supra note 6, at 1-13 (explaining specific labeling
requirements in various bills).
106. See generally id. (describing the form of nutrition labeling). See also, e.g., S.B. 686, §
I (c)(1), 2007 Leg., 2007 Sess. (Conn. 2007) (requiring calories to be posted next to menu items in
a size and typeface similar to other information on the menu).
107. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., HEALTH CODE § 81.50 (2008); see also N.Y. CITY DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE, NEW YORK CITY HEALTH CODE, NOTICE OF ADOPTION OF AN
AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 81 OF THE NEW YORK CITY HEALTH CODE 1-6 (2006),
http://www.nyc.gov/htmlldoh/downloads/pdf/public/notice-adoption-hc-art8I-50.pdf [hereinafter
NYC NOTICE].
108. See, e.g., Roni Caryn Rabin, Calorie Labels May Clarify Options, Not Actions, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 2007, at F6; Fran Silverman, They're All Bad for You, But Should They Be
Illegal?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2007, § 14 (Conn.), at 6. The Center for Consumer Freedom
criticized the New York Regulation as being "shortsighted," and stated that "Mayor Bloomberg's
Big Brother Board of Health is getting more outrageous as it spends taxpayer funded time and
money regulating food choices, when its own internal research shows the law will only impact 3
percent of the average calories in a New Yorker's diet." Press Release, The Center for Consumer
Freedom, Consumer Group Criticizes NYC Board of Health Over Menu Labeling Bill, (Jan. 22,
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stated that, because it is "charged with preventing and controlling diseases," it
had an interest in consumers' informed decision-making. 1°9 The Board cited a
study finding that nine out of ten people surveyed "underestimated the calorie
content of less-healthy items by an average of more than 600 calories."' 10
Thus, providing nutrition information could potentially have a great effect on
how New Yorkers make food decisions.'ll
Shortly after New York City passed this legislation, the King County Board
of Health in Seattle, Washington, passed its own nutrition labeling law
mandating that restaurants disclose nutrition information on menus I and
menu boards." 3  The regulation is limited to restaurants that operate at least
ten branches nationwide and collectively gross at least one million dollars in
sales. 114
In September 2008, California made news when it declared that chain
restaurants with twenty or more locations in the state must provide caloric
information next to each item on their menus.1 15 Governor Schwarzenegger
proclaimed, "[b]y being the first state to provide this information to consumers,
California is continuing to lead the nation with programs and policies that
promote health and nutrition."
116
Although several states have considered the idea of menu-labeling
legislation in the past few years, conditions have only recently become ripe to
2008), http://www.consumerfreedom.com/print.cfml?id=226&page=release (last visited Jan. 29,
2009).
109. See NYC NOTICE, supra note 107, at 1.
110. See id. at 2; see also Scot Burton et al., Attacking the Obesity Epidemic: The Potential
Health Benefits of Providing Nutrition Information in Restaurants, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1669,
1670-71 (Sept. 2006), available at http://www.ajph.org/cgi/reprint/96/9/1669. The study also
found that ninety percent of study participants underestimated the number of calories in a
restaurant serving of fettuccine alfredo, a chef's salad, and chicken fajitas. Specifically, the
participants' mean calorie expectation estimates were 704 calories for the fettuccine alfredo
(actual calories: 1500), 452 for the chefs salad (actual calories: 930), and 704 for the chicken
fajitas (actual calories: 1660). Id. at 1670.
111. See NYC NOTICE, supra note 107, at 1-3. The study performed by Scot Burton and
associates discovered that when participants learned that seemingly healthful dishes such as a
chefs salad contained much more fat and calories than expected, they were less likely to choose
that item from the menu. See Burton, supra note 110, at 1674.
112. KING COUNTY, WASH., BOARD OF HEALTH CODE ch. 5.10.015 (2008) ("The nutrition
labeling of food shall include, but not be limited to, the total number of calories; . . . the total
number of grams of trans fat; . . . saturated fat; . . . carbohydrate[s]; and . . . milligrams of
sodium.").
113. Id. ("Each chain food establishment that uses a menu board shall post on the menu
board the total number of calories per standard menu item in a size and typeface similar to other
information on the menu board about the item.").
114. See id.
115. Press Release, Gov. Schwarzenegger Signs Legislation, supra note 9.
116. Id.
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enact these bills.117  It seems that more Americans are starting to take the
obesity epidemic seriously, to the point that many have encouraged their state
representatives to act. l18 Currently, there are efforts in both New York and
Washington State to enlarge the scope of New York City and Seattle's menu-
labeling legislation to include the rest of their respective states. 19 Introduced
on January 17, 2008, Washington Senate Bill 6505 has identical requirements
to King County's menu-labeling law.' The drafter of the bill, Senator
Rodney Tom, expressed his concern over restaurant patrons' lack of nutritional
knowledge in ordering from a chain restaurant's menu. I12 He stated that
"consumers want to make the right choices .... You can be thinking, 'I'm
going to take the chocolate shake and skip the hamburger,' but that would be
the worst choice for you."'
122
Despite new and continuing efforts to adopt menu-labeling laws, proponents
of the legislation have experienced considerable challenges and
disappointments. On September 11, 2007, Federal District Court Judge
Richard Holwell struck down New York City's menu-labeling law as expressly
preempted by the NLEA, because the law only applied to restaurants that
voluntarily posted nutrition information. 123 Judge Howell found that voluntary
disclosure of nutrition information amounted to a "voluntary nutrient content
claim," a category of disclosure that no state can regulate as mandated by the
117. See THE KEYSTONE CENTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 14 (noting that currently, "sixty-
four percent of all U.S. adults are overweight, including thirty percent who are obese," and
medical expenses associated with obesity are estimated to cost U.S. citizens as much as $92.6
billion per year). Since the passage of the NLEA, forty-eight percent of people in their study
report using nutrition information to make healthful food decisions. Id. at 72.
118. See CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST, PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR MENU LABELING AT
CHAIN RESTAURANTS, http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/census-menu-boardquestion.pdf (last
visited Jan. 29, 2009) (showing that several polls conducted by various groups found that sixty-
seven to eighty-four percent of those polled thought that restaurants should be required to post
nutrition data on their menus); see also NYC NOTICE, supra note 107, at 2 (finding that diabetes
has doubled over the past ten years and currently 750,000 New Yorkers have diabetes); WOOTAN,
supra note 1, at 3 ("Obesity is one of the greatest health challenges of our time.").
119. S.B. 6505, 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008); A. 729, 2007-2008 Assem., Reg.
Sess., (N.Y. 2007); S. 3787, 2007-2008 Assem., Reg. Sess., (N.Y. 2007); see also Yu Nakayama,
Bills Ask: What's on the Menu?, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 1, 2008, at B5; NY Restaurant Group Sues
to Avert Menu-labeling, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, June 15, 2006, http://www.nrn.com/
article.aspx?keyword=&menuid=l 368&id=341844.
120. See S.B. 6505, 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008). Along with S.B. 6505,
Washington lawmakers are also considering S.B. 6659, which only requires chain restaurants
with twenty-five or more locations to post caloric data on menu boards, and S.B. 6786, which
seeks to create a task force to study the costs and effects of menu-labeling before adopting any
such legislation. S.B. 6659 § 2(1), 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008); S.B. 6786 § 2(6),
2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008); see also Nakayama, supra note 119.
12 1. Nakayama, supra note 119.
122. Id.
123. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 509 F. Supp. 2d 351, 363 (S.D.N.Y.
2007).
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preemption provisions of the NLEA. 124  Also, after the California state
legislature passed its first statewide menu-labeling bill in September 2007,
Governor Schwarzenegger vetoed the bill out of a concern for restaurant
owners' ability to bear the costs of menu-labeling.
125
Nonetheless, lawmakers continue to make menu-labeling a priority. After
its first attempt was struck down, the New York City Board of Health voted to
adopt a new bill to require menu-labeling, this time applying the provision to
all New York chain restaurants, not just those that already provide nutrition
information to the public. 126 The law was again challenged by the New York
State Restaurant Association, and the case again came before Judge Holwell;
but Judge Holwell upheld this new version as no longer preempted by the
NLEA. l17  The health code went into effect on March 31, 2008, and city
officials started issuing fines for noncompliance on July 19, 2008.128 Further,
legislators in California succeeded in getting their second menu-labeling bill
past Governor Schwarzenegger's desk. On August 31, 2008, the state
assembly of California passed S.B. 1420, again hoping to become the first state
in the nation to require calorie counts on restaurant menus. 129  The state
assembly adopted certain changes to the bill-such as its application to chains
with twenty or more locations as opposed to only fifteen, and an effective date
124. Id. ("By making its requirements contingent on a voluntary claim, Regulation 81.50
directly implicates ... [the] preemption provision."); see also discussion on preemption infra Part
Ill.
125. S.B. 120, 2007 Leg., 2007 Sess. (Cal. 2007) (Governor Schwarzenegger's veto
message), available at http://gov.ca.gov/pdf/press/SB%20120%20veto%20message.pdf. The
Governor stated that the bill placed the burden and cost of menu-labeling solely on restaurant
owners while allowing them no flexibility to implement their own nutrition information
disclosures. Id.; see also Press Release, Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest, California Legislature
Passes Historic Menu Labeling Bill (Sept. 11, 2007), available at http://www.cspinet.org/new/
200709111 .html; Press Release, Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest, Menu Labeling Veto a
"Giant, Greasy Stain" on Schwarzenegger Health Record (Oct. 15, 2007), available at
http://www.cspinet.org/new/200710151 .html.
126. See Diane Cardwell, City Tries Again to Require Restaurants to Post Calories, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2008, at B2.
127. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, No. 08 Civ. 1000(RJH), 2008 WL
1752455, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2008) ("[T]he Court concludes that Regulation 81.50 is not
preempted by [the] NLEA because that statute explicitly leaves to state and local governments the
power to impose mandatory nutrition labeling by restaurants.").
128. CSPI 2007-08 BILLS, supra note 6, at 1-2; see also Cardwell, supra note 126; Rabin,
supra note 13.
129. See S.B. 1420, 2008 Leg., 2007-2008 Sess. (Cal. 2008); Patrick McGreevy, State
Senate Passes Restaurant-Calorie Bill, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2008, available at http://www.la
times.com/news/local/politics/cal/la-me-menul-2008sep01,0,384106.story; see also The Official
Site for California Legislative Information, Complete Bill History, http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-
08/bill/sen/sb_1401-1450/sb_1420 bill 20080831_history.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2008).
[Vol. 58:501
2009] The Need for Federal Menu-Labeling Legislation
of 2011-which eventually persuaded the Governor to sign it on September
30, 2008.130
As of January 1, 2009, several jurisdictions have menu-labeling bills
pending before their legislatures or city councils, including: Chicago,
Illinois; 131 Westchester County, New York; 132 Hawaii;
13 3 Iowa;' 3 4 Kentucky; 35
Massachusetts; 13 6  New Jersey; 13 7  New York; 13  Pennsylvania; 139  and
Washington State. 140 Most of these bills have been recently introduced or are
currently in committee. 14 1 If even a portion of them eventually pass, they will
significantly affect interstate commerce.
III. MENU-LABELING LAWS ARE SUBJECT TO THE PREEMPTION PARAMETERS
OF THE NUTRITION LABELING AND EDUCATION ACT
In order for a state law to be valid under the Commerce Clause, it must not
only be devoid of any protectionist effect, but it also must not be preempted by
any superceding congressional legislation. 142 As mentioned above, Congress
has enacted menu-labeling legislation. 143  In 1990, Congress enacted the
NLEA, creating an across-the-board standard for nutrition labels on packaged
130. Press Release, Gov. Schwarzenegger Signs Legislation, supra note 9; Patrick
McGreevy, supra note 129; see also Press Release, Senator Alex Padilla, Padilla Menu Labeling
Bill Goes to the Governor (Aug. 31, 2008), available at http://dist20.casen.govoffice.com/
index.asp?Type=B_PR&SEC ={5EACFA 15-EA6B-41 D8-971 I-C03OF9FAD5EE} &DE = {D28F9
6C7-EEFI -43ED-89B1-91 E9077301 B8}&Design=PrintView.
131. See CSPI 2007-08 BILLS, supra note 6, at 3; Chicago Alderman Resurrects Menu-
Labeling Bill, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Mar. 14, 2008, available at http://www.nrn.com/
article.aspx?id=351648#.
132. CSPI 2007-08 BILLS, supra note 6, at 4-5.
133. H.B. 54, 24th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2007), available at http://www.capitol.
hawaii.gov/session2008/bills/HB54_.htm.
134. S.F. 2158, 82d Gen. Assem., 2008 Sess. (Iowa 2008).
135. S.B. 211, 2008 Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008).
136. S.B. 1290, 185th Gen. Court, 2007-2008 Sess. (Mass. 2007); see also CSPI 2007-08
BILLS, supra note 6, at 9.
137. A. 1407, 213th Leg., 2008 Sess. (N.J. 2008).
138. A. 729, 2007 State Assem., 2007 Sess. (N.Y. 2007). The Health Committee amended
the bill on May 9, 2008 to change the definition of chain restaurant from a chain consisting often
locations to fifteen. CSPI 2007-08 BILLS, supra note 6, at 10-11. On June 17, 2008, the
Committee on Codes passed the bill and referred it to the Committee on Rules. Id.
139. H.B. 1108, 2007 Gen. Assem., 2007 Sess. (Pa. 2007), available at http://www.legis.
state.pa.us/cfdocsIbillinfoIbillinfo.cfm?syear=2007&sind=0&body=H&type=B&BN=I 108.
140. S.B. 6505, 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008); CSPI 2007-08 BILLS, supra note
6, at 13.
141. See CSPI 2007-08 BILLS, supra note 6 for status on the legislation.
142. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 426 (1819) (ruling that under the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution federal law is supreme, and that any state law that
interferes with the Constitution or an act of Congress pursuant to the Constitution is invalid).
143. See Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343 (q)-(r) (2000)).
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foods. 144 The other significant change the NLEA made to existing law
governed a producer's use of health or nutrient "claims" on food packaging,
such as "fiber prevents cancer" and "low fat.'
145
The purpose of the Act was to "clarify and to strengthen the Food and Drug
Administration's legal authority to require nutrition labeling on foods, and to
establish the circumstances under which claims may be made about nutrients in
foods."'14 6 The bill addressed many problems in the food industry, such as lack
of uniformity, enforcement, and up-to-date standards in product labeling
requirements. 4 7  However, along with providing uniform labeling
requirements for American businesses, Congress also sought to enact the bill
for the good of American consumers.' 4 8 By being more educated, Congress
144. See id. The NLEA added two new provisions to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act: section 343(q), mandating the use of a standardized nutrition label, and § 343(r), regulating
nutrient and health claims. 21 U.S.C. § 343(q) (2000); id. § 343(r); see also Statement by
President George Bush Upon Signing H.R. 3562, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3354 (statement of
President George H.W. Bush in signing the NLEA into law). Section 343(q) requires what many
Americans have come to know as the "Nutrition Facts" label on packaged food products. 21
U.S.C. § 343(q)(1). Section 343(q)(1) states: "food intended for human consumption and is
offered for sale" must provide information regarding serving size, total number of servings per
container, total number of calories derived from any source, calories derived from fat, and finally
the amount of "[t]otal fat, saturated fat, cholesterol, sodium, total carbohydrates, complex
carbohydrates, sugars, dietary fiber, and total protein contained in each serving size .... " Id.
145. 136 CONG. REC. H5841 (1990). Manufacturers printed these various claims on
packages to convince more customers to buy certain products because they are supposedly more
healthful. See LAURA SIMS, THE POLITICS OF FAT: FOOD AND NUTRITION POLICY IN AMERICA
202 (1998). Because these claims were never before held to an across-the-board standard, a
producer could claim that anywhere from 200 mg to 2000 mg of sodium constituted "low
sodium." See H.R. REP. NO. 101-538, at 18-19 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3336,
3338-39 (recognizing that "companies began making health claims on foods, even though the
FDA had not approved the claims"). Along with the regulation of mandatory nutrition
disclosures, the NLEA preempts states from regulating nutrient level or health claims. See 21
U.S.C. §§ 343(r), 343-1(a)(5) ("[N]o state or political subdivision of a state may directly or
indirectly establish . . . any requirement respecting any claim of the type described in section
343(r)(1) [health claims] of this title, made in the label or labeling of food that is not identical to
the requirement of section 343(r) of this title, except a requirement respecting a claim ... which
is exempt under 343(r)(5)(B) .... "). Unlike its terms for mandatory nutrition labeling, the NLEA
does not exclude restaurants from claim regulations in substantial part. Compare 21 U.S.C. §
343(r)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (addressing regulations that apply to restaurants), with id § 343(r)(2)(A)(iii)
(addressing parameters that do not apply to restaurants).
146. H.R. REP. NO. 101-538, at 7 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3336, 3337.
147. See id at 7-9.
148. See 136 CONG. REC. S16,609 (1990). Senator Mitchell commented that the bill would
"help all consumers to better understand and improve their eating habits by providing uniform
nutritional information in a coherent and understandable format." Id. Americans can also be
more trusting of food labels because Congress mandated that the Food and Drug Administration
authorize any factual information and health claims companies make on food packaging. Id.
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reasoned, Americans can make healthful dietary decisions, specifically
regarding the prevention of heart disease and cancer.
The preemption provisions of the NLEA are fairly straightforward.
50
Although the Act expressly preempts certain types of state regulations, the
regulation of restaurants' nutrition data is not among them. 151 Congress did
not wish to require restaurants to comply with its mandatory nutrition
disclosure requirements.' 52 The NLEA exempts restaurants from that section
of the statute so that they do not have to place a nutrition-facts label on the
foods they sell.' 53 This exemption also removed restaurant regulation from the
preemption parameters of the NLEA.' 54 Therefore, while states cannot pass
laws that differ from the nutrition labeling requirements of the NLEA for food
149. Id. at S16,609-10. It is important to note that the two main problems the NLEA sought
to address were regulatory in nature. Although the prevention of heart disease and cancer was
another goal of the NLEA, the passage of the act was not fueled by a national health crisis. See
id. at 16,608-10. Congress's primary health-related concern was fulfilling Americans' desire for
accurate nutritional information. See 136 CONG. REC. E3636 (1990) ("For years now, consumers
have had to struggle with food labels that are hard to read, difficult to understand, and sometimes
misleading. . . . [W]e have [a] responsibility to make certain they are receiving accurate
information about the food they purchase."). Congress's emphasis on informational accuracy,
and not public health, may be because in 1990 only 11.6% of Americans were clinically obese
(having a body mass index above 30.0). See Ctr. for Disease Control, Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System, Trends Data Nationwide on Obesity, http://apps.nccd.cdc.govlbrfss/Trends/
trendchart.asp?qkey= 10010&state=US (last visited Sept. 15, 2008).
150. See Michele M. Bradley, The States' Role in Regulating Food Labeling and
Advertising: The Effect of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 49 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 649, 659 (1994) ("[The NLEA] should not be construed as preempting state law that is not
expressly preempted."); see also 136 CONG. REC. S16,608 (1990). Before the NLEA passed the
Senate, Senator Metzenbaum sought to clarify the preemption terms of the NLEA. He stated that,
"because food sold in restaurants is exempt from the nutrition labeling requirements of [the
NLEA], the bill does not preempt any State nutrition labeling requirements for restaurants." Id.
151. See 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a)(4) (2000).
152. Id. §§ 343(q)(5)(A)(i), 343-1(a)(4). The writers of the Act recognized that some foods
would be difficult to label and thus adopted various accommodations for food sold in bulk, raw
agricultural food (fruits and vegetables), and raw fish. H.R. REP. No. 101-538, at 14-15 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3336, 3344-45. Following this rationale, the next section of the
Act exempts certain foods and sellers from compliance with § 343(q)(1). First are restaurants and
similar establishments that prepare food on the premises which is ready for human consumption.
21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(i)-(ii). With this exemption, Congress sought to cover not only
restaurants, but also establishments such as cafeterias, hospitals, bakeries and delicatessens. H.R.
REP. No. 101-538, at 15 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3336, 3345.
153. 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(A)(i).
154. See 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a)(4). However, an examination of the plain wording of the
NLEA leads to the conclusion that, by expressly excluding restaurants from the requirements of §
343(q), Congress meant to leave this area of regulation open to the states. With respect to
nutrition information disclosures, the Act states: "[N]o state or political subdivision of a state may
directly or indirectly establish . . . any requirement for nutrition labeling of food that is not
identical to the requirement of section 343(q) [mandatory nutrition labeling] ... except. . . food
which is exempt under [§ 343(q)(5)(A)(i)] [food served in restaurants]." Id.
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products, they are free to regulate restaurants' disclosure of nutrition
information.
1V
This exemption is the result of a compromise among health activists, the
restaurant industry, and those advocating states' rights under the NLEA. 156
Supporters of the original bill wanted restaurants to be included in the labeling
requirements of § 343(q), but the restaurant industry lobbied vehemently
against such a regulatory burden.1 57 In the end, Congress compromised and
provided restaurants certain exemptions to the labeling requirements of §
343(q), concluding that the federal government should be cautious when
intervening in the states' right to protect the health and safety of their
citizens.
158
Although state regulation of menus and menu boards may avoid express
preemption, they may still fall within the purview of the Dormant Commerce
Clause. 159  If a state may require restaurants to provide the public with
nutrition information, the question is whether state menu-labeling laws are
nonetheless invalid because they impermissibly impede interstate commerce.
IV. ANALYZING MENU-LABELING LEGISLATION UNDER THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE
A. No Evidence ofDiscrimination from the Plain Text
It is fairly easy to see that, on its face, menu-labeling legislation is not
discriminatory against out-of-state competition. The legislation consists of
health regulations that seek to help consumers make informed decisions when
choosing items from a restaurant menu. 16  Unlike other laws that have been
struck down for violating the Dormant Commerce Clause,16 1 menu labeling is
155. See Craig Jordan, Preemption and Uniform Enforcement of Food Marketing
Regulations, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 401, 405 (1994) ("[S]tates may adopt their own NLEA-type
statutes, as long as the requirements of those statutes pertaining to preempted areas are identical
to the federal statutes.").
156. See Bradley, supra note 150, at 652-54.
157. SIMS, supra note 145, at 200.
158. 136 CONG. REC. H5840 (1990).
159. See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 532 (1949) (striking down
a New York state law enacted under state police power prohibiting distributors of milk from
purchasing their supply from dealers who were not licensed by the state because its actual
objective was not protecting the health of its citizens, but rather protecting New York dealers
from out-of-state competition).
160. See, e.g., S.B. 1420, § 1(g), 2008 Leg., 2007-2008 Sess. (Cal. 2008) ("Consumers
should be provided with point of purchase access to nutritional information when eating out in
order to make informed decisions involving their health and diet.").
161. See, e.g., Ex parte Foley, 158 P. 1034, 1034-36 (Cal. 1916) (finding a law, which
required imported eggs to be labeled as foreign, and required stores where the eggs were sold to
post signs disclosing that the eggs were imported, was a violation of the Commerce Clause);
Welsh Farms, Inc. v. Bergsma, 84 A.2d 631, 641-42 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1951) (striking
down a New Jersey law that required milk from out of state to be labeled as such).
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not concerned with the origin of the food (in-state versus out-of-state). 162 The
regulations do not typically distinguish between restaurants that operate locally
or nationally, focusing instead on the number of locations a certain restaurant
operates. 63 Nor does the legislation draw lines at the state's boundaries; most
labeling legislation simply imposes certain requirements on restaurants that
sustain enough capital to absorb the cost of creating new menus.'
64
B. A Fundamental Blow: Menu-Labeling Legislation was Not Fueled by Goals
of Impeding Interstate Commerce, But It Nonetheless Has That Effect
Along with a lack of facial discrimination, it is also fairly clear that state
menu-labeling legislation appears not to have a discriminatory purpose or
intent. The drafters of such laws have plainly stated that their purpose is to
inform consumers, helping them make healthier decisions. 165 For example, in
the recently enacted California bill, S.B. 1420, the state legislature made the
following findings:
Research continues to reveal the strong link between diet and health
... . Increased caloric intake is a key factor contributing to the
alarming increase in obesity in the United States . . . . Obesity
increases the risk of diabetes, heart disease, stroke, some cancers and
other health problems .... Over the past two decades, there has been
a significant increase in the number of meals prepared or eaten
outside the home .... Consumers should be provided with point of
purchase access to nutrition information when eating out in order to
make informed decisions involving their health and diet.
166
The majority of pending or enacted legislation adopts this rationale.
67
162. See, e.g., S.B. 1420 § 2(a)(7) (defining "standard menu item" as "a food or beverage
item offered for sale by a food facility through a menu, menu board, or display tag at least 180
days per calendar year").
163. See, e.g., KING COUNTY, WASH., BOARD OF HEALTH CODE ch. 5.10.005(A)-.015(B),
(C) (2007) ("'Chain food establishment' means any one of at least ten food establishments within
the United States doing business under the same name and collectively having at least one million
dollars in gross annual sales and offering for sale substantially the same menu items .... "); see
also CSPI, 2007-08 BILLS, supra note 6, at 1-13; supra note 104.
164. See, e.g., KING COUNTY, WASH., BOARD OF HEALTH CODE ch. 5.10.005(A) (applying
regulation to restaurants with ten or more locations and "having at least one million dollars in
gross annual sales").
165. See NYC NOTICE, supra note 107, at 1-3 ("New York City needs to address the rapidly
growing twin epidemics of obesity and diabetes. Calorie labeling is a public health intervention
to help address these problems.").
166. S.B. 1420, §1 (a)-(g), 2008 Leg., 2007-2008 Sess. (Cal. 2008).
167. See CSPI 2007-08 BILLS, supra note 6, at 1-13.
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However, simply stating a health concern as justification for a state law that
burdens interstate commerce will not shield it from constitutional scrutiny.
168
Legislation that cites even the most sincere health concern as its stated purpose
may be struck down when it nonetheless has a discriminatory effect on
interstate commerce. 169 Most state menu-labeling laws only apply to chain
restaurants that wish to do business within a state's borders.' 7 By exempting
smaller chain restaurants (less than ten locations in most laws), the states
effectively discriminate against out-of-state commerce. Few restaurants
having ten or more stores operate solely within one state; most of these
restaurants are national corporations. 17 1  Indeed, the intent of most menu-
labeling laws is to require fast-food establishments to post caloric information
on their menu boards. The most significant effect of such legislation will be
felt by restaurants like McDonald's, Burger Kin%, Wendy's, and others that
operate not only nationally but internationally. The appropriate inquiry
should not focus on whom these laws affect, but whom do they not affect?
Typically, restaurants operating fewer than ten locations nationally will be
local, in-state restaurants.1 73 Consequently, the legislation places the heaviest
burden on restaurants that operate in multiple states, while exempting local
restaurants. This effectively amounts to protectionist legislation. 174
The discriminatory effect of menu-labeling legislation becomes clear when
one considers the Court's opinion in Hunt v. Washington State Apple
168. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 647 (1951) (Vinson, J., dissenting) ("Lack of
discrimination on its face has not heretofore been regarded as sufficient to sustain an ordinance
without inquiry into its practical effects upon interstate commerce.").
169. See, e.g., State v. Jacobson, 157 P. 1108, 1112 (Or. 1916) (holding that a state law
regulating the labeling of eggs imported from foreign countries as "imported" violated the
Commerce Clause).
170. See supra note 104 for a list of recent state menu-labeling laws.
171. See CHAIN STORE GUIDE, RESTAURANT INDUSTRY SUMMARY 3 (Mar. 2008), available
at http://www.csgis.com/static-content/pdf/is-restO8.pdf.
172. See id. at 2 (discussing the expansion of chain restaurants into international markets).
173. See id. at 3-4 (noting that the biggest chains operate on a large level and are expanding
into the international arena more and more). When most chain restaurants do business on a
national and international level, it is unlikely that they will have only ten locations all within one
state. Thus, the effect of such legislation favors local "mom and pop" restaurants and disfavors
national and international corporations. Id. The writers of such legislation wanted to ensure that
smaller restaurants that are unable to absorb the costs of nutrient analysis and menu-labeling were
excluded from such requirements. Consequently, some legislation imposes gross annual sales
requirements in lieu of, or in addition to, a number-of-locations requirement. See, e.g., KING
COUNTY, WASH., BOARD OF HEALTH CODE ch. 5.10.005 (2007) (setting a threshold of one
million dollars in gross annual sales).
174. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 532-33 (1949) (Justice Jackson
stated, "neither the power to tax nor the police power may be used by the state of destination with
the aim and effect of establishing an economic barrier against competition with the products of
another state or the labor of its residents. Restrictions so contrived are an unreasonable clog upon
the mobility of commerce.").
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Advertising Commission.1 75 The Court found the state statute unconstitutional
because, among other reasons, Washington State apple growers had to bear the
costs of changing their labeling system in order to comply with North
Carolina's standard. 176  With respect to menu-labeling legislation, the
inequitable effect is multiplied by the number of different state standards and
the amount of chain restaurants affected by such legislation. This burdensome
result is not likely to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
C. Menu-Labeling Legislation and the Pike Balancing Test: Benefits Versus
Burdens
In the modem era, the Supreme Court has continued to invalidate state laws
that are facially neutral and have neither a discriminatory purpose nor
discriminatory effect. 177 Laws that impose a burden on interstate commerce
greater than the potential state benefit derived from the legislation are held
unconstitutional. 178 This balancing test, as applied to menu-labeling
legislation, yields an interesting result. The possible health benefit of such
legislation is high, but it is not certain to have a significant effect on the
obesity epidemic, because an individual's weight loss can depend on a number
of factors other than nutritional education. 17 Furthermore, the burden on
interstate commerce is certain, especially if states continue to adopt different
regulations. The burdensome outcome, when coupled with the
determination that menu-labeling legislation also has a discriminatory effect,'
8 1
confirms that the legislation is unconstitutional.
1. The Burden on Restaurants that Operate on a Multi-State Level
The burden of compliance with labeling laws on chain restaurants is
twofold. First, each restaurant chain will sustain quantifiable costs associated
with calibrating the nutrient value of each menu item while replacing menus
175. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
176. Id. at 350-51; see also discussion supra Part I.B.
177. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 674-75 (1981) (holding
that a ban on double trailers substantially impedes interstate commerce because carriers would
have to either use only single trailers, use shorter doubles, detach double trailers at the borders, or
divert trucks around the state of Iowa); S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 783-84 (1945)
(striking down the Arizona Train Limit Law as not reducing health hazards enough to justify its
burden on interstate commerce).
178. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
179. See, e.g., CLINICAL GUIDELINES, supra note 5, at 47-48 ("The combination of a reduced
calorie diet and increased physical activity produces greater weight loss than diet alone or
physical activity alone."). Further, some people will still choose to consume highly caloric dishes
even after reading the item's caloric value on the menu. See Rabin, supra note 13 (describing
how patrons at a T.G.I. Friday's restaurant asked servers for an older version of the menu in order
to avoid viewing the guilt-inducing nutritional information).
180. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
181. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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and menu boards. 182 Less than half of all restaurants currently already provide
some sort of nutrition information to the public via websites or pamphlets. 83
The other half of large restaurant chains who do not provide such information
must have their items analyzed for nutrient content. Laboratory costs for such
scientific findings are fairly expensive. One menu item could cost a restaurant
$500 to analyze, and a 100-item menu could cost as much as $22,000 to have
analyzed. 184 Furthermore, new menu boards have to be designed and printed, a
cost estimated to be around $200-$300 per sign.' 85
Secondly, the real cost to restaurants will be creating new internal systems
and procedures to ensure compliance with the state regulations.' 86 Restaurants
must expend considerable effort to ensure that each menu board complies with
the destination state's requirements.' 87 First, the restaurant chain would have
to determine which states had menu-labeling requirements and which did not;
and second, if the state requires labeling, the specific requirements of each
state. 188  For example, McDonald's would need to send a menu board
containing caloric information to all stores in California, while sending plain
menu boards to a state without labeling requirements.' 89 In addition, printed
menus going to New York City would only need caloric information, while
menus going to King County, Washington, would have to contain saturated fat,
trans fat, sodium, and carbohydrate data. 190  Making the situation more
complicated, restaurants also offer different menu items according to specific
182. See MYTH supra note 20, at 2.
183. Barbara A. Almanza et al., Obstacles to Nutrition Labeling in Restaurants, 100 J. AM.
DIETETIC ASS'N, 157, 157 (1997). The authors surveyed the largest chain restaurants in the U.S.
and found that about 65% do not provide consumers with any nutrition information. Id
184. Rebecca S. Fribush, Comment, Putting Calorie and Fat Counts on the Table: Should
Mandatory Nutritional Disclosure Laws Apply to Restaurant Foods?, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
377, 386 (2005).
185. Sturgeon, supra note 21.
186. Id. ("[Dunkin' Donuts] can't pinpoint ... compliance costs since the final bill will
include more than just designers' fees and manufacturing costs for the actual signs. Some
situations will involve third-party installers, as well as redirecting a number of in-house man
hours.").
187. See generally MYTH, supra note 20, at 2 (arguing that menu labeling is not a one-time
cost and that the cost of redesigning menus and menu boards would be substantial).
188. See supra note 104. Menu-labeling requirements of each state also vary in what
information must be disclosed. See CSPI 2007-08 BILLS, supra note 6, at 1-13. While most
states require only calories to be posted on menu boards, states can vary significantly in nutrition
information requirements for printed menus. See id For example, King County, Washington
requires that calories, saturated fat, carbohydrates, and sodium be on menus, while pending
legislation in Chicago only requires calorie, fat and sodium counts. Id. at 3, 13.
189. See CSPI 2003-04 BILLS, supra note 102; CSPI 2007-08 BILLS, supra note 6, at 2-3, 6.
190. Compare NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., HEALTH CODE § 81.50 (2008), with KING COUNTY,
WASH., BOARD OF HEALTH CODE ch. 5.10 (2007).
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markets across the country, 191 and restaurant menu boards can vary
significantly among locations even within the same state.'
92
Dissimilar regulations on nutritional information were a major motivating
factor for the restaurant industry in supporting the NLEA in the late 1980s.
9 3
History has already begun to repeat itself with respect to menu-labeling laws
that are currently in effect. Steve Caldeira, chief global communications and
public affairs officer of Dunkin' Donuts, proclaimed that "[t]his patchwork of
policies around the country is making it extremely difficult for us to conduct
our business."' 9 4 In a 2007 press release, the National Restaurant Association
stated, "[m]any restaurants already provide nutritional information to their
customers through the use of brochures, posters, kiosks, packaging, tray liners,
and the Internet. Restaurants should have the flexibility they need to continue
to most effectively provide nutrition information to their customers."'' 95 Now,
not only will restaurants be unable to choose the method by which they convey
nutrition information to customers, but they will also have to follow the
requirements of various jurisdictions.
2. The Health Benefits of Menu Labeling
While the potential burden on interstate commerce is substantial, the health
benefits from such legislation could be significant as well. States have a
"fundamental right . . . to pass laws to secure the [health and] safety of their
citizens. ' 96 Menu-labeling laws are justified because nutrition information is
essential in making informed health decisions.'
97
State legislatures that have passed menu-labeling legislation are concemed
about the effect that restaurant foods have on their citizens' health.1 98 States
191. See, e.g., Dawn Wotapka, It's Fast Food, but with Local Flavor, THE NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 30, 2001, at N4 (discussing how the McDonald's "Southern-
Style breakfast biscuit" is not found in Chicago).
192. Sturgeon, supra note 21. On the issue of cost, Steve Caldeira (chief global
communications and pubic affairs officer at Dunkin' Donuts) stated: "Our stores in New York
City contain a lot of different layouts and footprints, so we have had to work hard to develop a
solution that provides a range of solutions for different sizes .... I will say the costs aren't
insignificant." Id.
193. See The Impact of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 on the Food
Industry, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 605, 607 (1995) ("The industry believed that a federal food labeling
law would reduce its costs (at least in terms of having to comply with only one law instead of 50),
make compliance easier, educate customers more effectively, and cause less interference with
interstate distribution." (emphasis added)).
194. Sturgeon, supra note 21.
195. Press Release, Nat'l Rest. Ass'n, National Restaurant Association Praises Governor
Schwarzenegger for Vetoing Menu Labeling Bill (Oct. 15, 2007), available at http://www.
restaurant.org/pressroom/print/index.cfm?lD= 1507.
196. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 687 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
197. See Burton, supra note 110, at 1674.
198. See, e.g., NYC NOTICE, supra note 107, at 1-2.
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have found that the connection between Americans' increasing tendency to eat
out and the rising obesity rate is not merely a coincidence. Food purchased at
restaurants tends to be higher in fat and calories and lower in nutrients like
calcium and fiber. 199 Seemingly innocent dishes may contain exorbitant
amounts of calories and fat,200 and portions can be two or three times bigger
than the average serving size. 20 1 These extra servings do not stay on the plate
either-many studies show that people eat more when served larger
202portions. Further, it is almost impossible to estimate accurately the nutrition
203content of such dishes. Even nutritionists consistently underestimate the
caloric content of restaurant foods by as much as 200 to 600 calories
depending on the given dish.2°
In addition, there is evidence that shows that if provided with nutrition
information, consumers are likely to make food choices based on this data.205
199. See WOOTAN, supra note 1, at 6.
200. See id. at 10. For example, a chicken breast sandwich from Schlotzsky's Deli contains
1010 calories, and a grande mocha latte from Starbucks contains 110 more calories than a
hamburger from Burger King. Id. at 8, 10.
201. Id. at 11.
202. See generally Jennifer Orlet Fisher et al., Children s Bite Size and Intake of an Entr~e
Are Greater with Large Portions than with Age-Appropriate or Self-Selected Portions, 77 AM. J.
CLINICAL NUTRITION 1164, 1 164-70 (2003); Barbara J. Rolls et al., Serving Portion Size
Influences 5-Year-Old But Not 3-Year-Old Children's Food Intakes, 100 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS'N
232, 232-34 (2000); Brian Wansink, Can Package Size Accelerate Usage Volume?, 60 J.
MARKETING 1, 1-13 (1996); Lisa R. Young & Marion Nestle, The Contribution of Expanding
Portion Sizes to the U.S. Obesity Epidemic, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 246, 246-48 (2002).
203. See WOOTAN, supra note 1, at 13.
204. Id In a study conducted by the Center for Science in the Public Interest, dietitians were
asked to estimate the amount of calories in two cups of lasagna, a grilled chicken Caesar salad, a
porterhouse steak dinner, a ten-ounce hamburger with a serving of onion rings, and a tuna salad
sandwich. The results, depicted in the chart below, showed that dietitians underestimated caloric
amounts by 200 to 600 calories. Id.
Food Item Actual Calorie Average Calorie Percent
Content Estimate Difference
Lasagna (2 cups) 960 695 28% under
Grilled Chicken Caesar 660 440 33% under
Salad with Dressing (4 cups)
Porterhouse Steak Dinner 1860 1240 33% under
(dinner included 20 oz.
steak, 2 cups Caesar salad, I
cup vegetables, and a baked
potato with I tbsp. butter)
Hamburger (10 oz.) and 1550 865 44% under
Onion Rings (11 rings)
Tuna Salad Sandwich (11 720 374 48% under
oz.)
Id.
205. Rabin, supra note 13. A New Yorker describing her experience with menu labels stated,
"I was blown away .... I'm not a no-carb type of person, and I usually don't even think about it.
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In a study conducted in 1996, 48% of people reported changing their minds
about a particular food item based on a package's nutrition label. 206 Most
people have no idea that certain foods contain dangerous levels of calories, fat,
and sodium. 20 7  Therefore, if this nutrition information is available to
consumers at the point of sale, it is likely to affect their decision. While about
35% of restaurants provide at least some nutrition information, 20 8 this
information is often found in pamphlets and other places that are inconvenient
for the customer to view. 209 Further, many restaurants only provide nutrition
information online, requiring advance planning to choose healthy items.
210
States hope that by requiring restaurants to post nutritional information on
menus, consumers will make educated decisions in choosing their meals.
211
These educated decisions may in turn help reduce obesity rates and prevent
chronic health conditions such as heart disease and diabetes.
212
3. The Scales Do Not Lie: Consumer Education Is Outweighed by Onerous
Interstate Regulations
Taking these competing interests into consideration, menu-labeling
legislation likely violates the Commerce Clause, even though the violation is
. ... .213
not as clear as similar cases in Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Court inKassel recognized that "[t]hose who would challenge . . . bona fide [state]
But you pick up a little muffin with your coffee, and it has 630 calories in it? That's a bit
extreme!" Id.
206. ALAN S. LEVY & BRENDA M. DERBY, CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION,
THE IMPACT OF THE NLEA ON CONSUMERS: RECENT FINDINGS FROM FDA'S FOOD LABEL AND
NUTRITION TRACKING SYSTEM 5 (1996).
207. See WOOTAN, supra note 1, at 13.
208. See id. at 14 ("A survey of the largest chain restaurants found that two-thirds (65%) do
not provide customers with any nutrition information.").
209. See id at 15.
210. See id.
211. See, e.g., Mariana Minaya, Menu Bill Would Order Nutitional Information, WASH.
POST, Aug. 1, 2007, at B2. The sponsor of the bill pending in Montgomery County, Maryland
stated that he just wanted to "provide consumers with more information." Id.
212. See THE KEYSTONE CENTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 72. The Report noted that "while
studies are limited, existing evidence finds that using food labels is associated with eating more
healthful diets." 1d; see also Song-Yong Kim et al., The Effect of Food Label Use on Nutrient
Intakes: An Endogenous Switching Regression Analysis, 25 J. AGRIC. RESOURCE ECON. 215,
215-30 (2000); Matthew W. Kreuter et al., Do Nutrition Label Readers Eat Healthier Diets?
Behavioral Correlates of Adults' Use of Food Labels, 13 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 277, 277-83
(1997); Marian L. Neuhouser et al., Use of Food Nutrition Labels Is Associated with Lower Fat
Intake, 99 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS'N. 45, 45-50 (1999).
213. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670-72 (1981) (finding
that an Iowa law forbidding sixty-five-foot double trailers on its highways had no real safety
benefit and actually made highways more unsafe); S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775
(1945) (find that a law restricting train length "had no reasonable relation to safety, and made
train operation more dangerous").
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safety regulations must overcome a 'strong presumption of validity.'"214 Yet if
a state cites its police power to justify a statute, it must still show that its health
or safety interest outweighs the burden on interstate commerce. 2 15 The effect
that menu-labeling legislation could have on a state's citizenry is substantial.
The posting of caloric data next to menu items could lead to increased
consumer awareness and consumer action.2 16  Ultimately, the hope is that
restaurant patrons will stray from items that contain an exorbitant amount of
calories and fat, leading to weight loss and a reduction in heart disease.
21 7
That there is no guarantee such laws will actually affect consumer decisions
threatens the validity of such legislation. Further, even though the law may
inform consumers' decisions, it might not help to reduce the rate of obesity. If
the effect of menu-labeling is anything like product labeling, it would be
almost impossible for a state to argue that the health benefits outweigh the
burden on interstate commerce. 218  Since the NLEA mandated nutrition
labeling in the early 1990s, obesity rates in America have continued to rise to
their current rate of thirty percent.2 19 If people are not looking at caloric and
fat information when it is placed directly on the package itself, what will make
them consider these values when next to a menu item? When state legislation
offers no real health or safety benefits to its citizenry, the law cannot stand
when it interferes with interstate commerce. 22° Certainly, such legislation does
give consumers the benefit of making an informed decision about the food they
eat. Whether this will actually help reduce obesity rates is speculative at best.
But a state's health interests in passing menu-labeling legislation is certainly
more than the "illusory' 2 1 interest noted in Kassel. In comparing menu-
labeling laws to Iowa's prohibition of sixty-five-foot double trailers in Kassel,
214. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 670 (quoting Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524
(1959)).
215. Id. at 670-71; see also Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350
(1977) ("[A] finding that state legislation furthers matters of legitimate local concern, even in the
health and consumer protection areas, does not end the inquiry. . . . Rather, when such state
legislation comes into conflict with the Commerce Clause's overriding requirement of a national
'common market,' we are confronted with the task of effecting an accommodation of the
competing national and local interests." (citations omitted)).
216. See Burton, supra note 110, at 1674 (finding that Americans significantly underestimate
fat and caloric content of restaurant foods, and if provided with accurate information, consumers
would make more healthful decisions).
217. See, e.g., S.B. 1420, §§ l(f)-(h), 2008 Leg., 2007-2008 Sess. (Cal. 2008).
218. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 108. Objecting to New York's menu-labeling law, Rick
Sampson of the New York State Restaurant Association said, "[d]o you think people will stop
eating McDonald's French fries and Big Macs? It doesn't keep me from eating a candy bar even
though the calories are listed on it right in front of me." Id.
219. THE KEYSTONE CENTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 14.
220. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 671.
221. Id. ("But where, as here, the State's safety interest has been found to be illusory, and its
regulations impair significantly the federal interest in efficient and safe interstate transportation,
the state law cannot be harmonized with the Commerce Clause.").
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menu-labeling legislation is more likely to withstand constitutional muster.
For example, the Court in Kassel noted that no evidence conclusively proved
that single trailers were any safer than sixty-five-foot double trailers. In
fact, the Court maintained that Iowa's law made the roads more dangerous
because it "require[d] more highway miles to be driven to transport the same
quantity of goods [and] ... accidents are proportional to distance traveled. 223
Such a conclusion could not be made about menu-labeling laws because there
is evidence that they would achieve their intended goals-studies show that
people make more healthful food choices when provided with nutritional
information.224  Further, it is doubtful that menu-labeling will cause more
patrons to choose foods with higher amounts of fat and calories over those with
lower amounts.
In balancing the health benefits of menu-labeling against the burdens placed
on chain restaurants, it is the probability of each that tips the scales of
constitutionality. Even though state legislation may help reduce heart disease
and obesity, it also may not effectively achieve that goal. On the other hand,
restaurants operating on a multi-state basis will have to comply with these
regulations regardless of whether a state's populace realizes some benefits or if
the legislation has no effect.225 Just as Consolidated Freightways had to divert
its trucks around Iowa, Starbucks will have to create and ship special menu
boards to locations in King County, Washington, and New York City.226 The
difference is that Consolidated Freightways only had to make special plans
227
with respect to one state, not many states. Here, Starbucks would have to
follow the specific regulations of each state that passes menu-labeling228
legislation. This onerous task is precisely what the Framers sought to avoid
by creating a unified republic and vesting the Commerce Clause power in
Congress.229
222. Id. at 672.
223. Id. at 674-75.
224. See Burton, supra note 110, at 1674.
225. See discussion supra Part IV.C. 1.
226. See KING COUNTY, WASH., BOARD OF HEALTH CODE ch. 5.10.015(c) (2007); NEW
YORK CITY, N.Y., HEALTH CODE § 81.50(b)(l)(a) (2008).
227. See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 665-66.
228. See supra notes 131-41 and accompanying text (listing of pending state and municipal
legislation).
229. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522-23 (1935) ("[The Constitution]
was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and
that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division."); see also Kassel, 450
U.S. at 669 (When a "State ventures excessively into the regulation of these aspects of commerce,
it 'trespasses upon national interests .... ' (citing Great Atil. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S.
366, 373 (1976))).
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V. FEDERAL REGULATION WOULD SATISFY THE COMPETING INTERESTS OF
CONSUMER HEALTH AND FREE TRADE
While the intentions of the Framers must be respected regarding
enforcement of the Dormant Commerce Clause, menu-labeling regulations are
not without merit. Invalidating menu-labeling laws under the Dormant
Commerce Clause is a solution to the problem, but only a partial one.
Although invalidation would eliminate the economic burden on restaurants that
operate nationally, it would also destroy an innovative solution to a recurring
problem. Therefore Congress should adopt a federal law, similar to the NLEA,
that creates a uniform standard that would not only allow restaurants to easily
comply with menu-labeling requirements, but would also give all Americans
the information they need to lead longer, healthier lives.
A federal menu-labeling law would not be the first time that Congress felt
the need to legislate in order to preserve the health and safety of Americans.
Congress has regulated in the areas of tobacco labeling, food labeling, and
television ratings.23° The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of
1965 required that cigarette packaging must contain a label that warns users of
the hazards of smoking. 23 1 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 called for the
implementation of a television rating system to help parents decide what
programs were appropriate for children.232  It further required television
manufacturers to use V-chip technology in all new televisions to facilitate the
new rating program. 233 As discussed above, the NLEA imposed important
food-labeling standards on packaged foods.234
A federal menu-labeling law would invoke criticism from members of the
legal community, but dissenters' concerns should not stop such a law from
enactment. As a result of their disagreement with the use of a balancing test
under the Dormant Commerce Clause, conservative members of the Court may
see no need for federal regulation if they believe the state laws are
235constitutionally valid. While it is true that the Court has held that state
health laws must be given "sensitive consideration," 236 menu-labeling laws
could be held invalid even without taking into consideration the balancing test.
These laws have a substantial discriminatory effect because of the burdens
230. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2000)); Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (2000)).
231. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act § 2.
232. Telecommunications Act § 551 (b)-(c).
233. Id. § 551(c).
234. See supra Part III.
235. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
236. See Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1978).
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placed on national chain restaurants. 237 If the balancing test is also considered,
the result only makes the unconstitutionality of menu-labeling laws more
evident.
It may be argued that state legislation could easily be made constitutional by
requiring all restaurants within the state to provide nutrition information on
their menus instead of solely placing the burden on chain restaurants. The
problem with this theory is that, while it eliminates some of the discriminatory
effect on multi-state restaurants, it still fails to provide them with national
uniformity. State requirements would differ on the type of information that
must be disclosed next to menu items. 23  This lack of uniformity was exactly
what prompted Congress to pass the NLEA in 1990, and it could be avoided
today with a federal menu-labeling law passed by Congress. 239
VI. CONCLUSION
Menu-labeling legislation could be a vital catalyst in the fight against
obesity, but it is unconstitutional for the states to impose inconsistent and
discriminatory labeling standards on restaurants that operate on a multi-state
level. It is only a matter of time before this dormant giant is awoken by menu-
labeling opponents, such as the National Restaurant Association. Congress
must adopt a federal law to ensure that restaurants can comply with such
regulations in a convenient manner, and also take a considerable step toward
ending the onslaught of obesity in the United States.
The menu-labeling issue can be summed up with Plato's astute observation
that "knowledge is the food of the soul. ' 24 0 Menus that provide nutritional
information will be able to educate restaurant patrons in a manner that will
feed their minds and bodies. If the goals of menu-labeling are achieved,
Americans will also be able to feed their souls when they obtain good health,
which is a priceless component of longevity, mobility, and overall well-being.
237. See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text.
238. See CSPI 2007-08 BILLS, supra note 6, at 1-13; see also supra note 104.
239. See H.R. REP. No. 101-538, at 7 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3336, 3337
(addressing the purpose of the NLEA).
240. PLATO, PROTAGORAS 19 (B. Jarrett trans., Kessinger Publ'g, 2004). Plato's words,
more than two millennia old, poignantly bear on the subject of menu-labeling in modem society:
[K]nowledge is the food of the soul; and we must take care.., that the Sophist does not
deceive us when he praises what he sells, like the dealers wholesale or retail who sell
the food of the body; for they praise indiscriminately all their goods, without knowing
what are really beneficial or hurtful: neither do their customers know, with the
exception of any trainer or physician who may happen to buy of them.
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